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Abstract
The unfolding of schematic formal systems is a novel concept which was initiated in Feferman
(in: Hajek (Ed.), Godel ’96, Lecture Notes in Logic, Springer, Berlin, 1996, pp. 3{22). This
paper is mainly concerned with the proof-theoretic analysis of various unfolding systems for
non-nitist arithmetic NFA. In particular, we examine two restricted unfoldings U0(NFA) and
U1(NFA), as well as a full unfolding, U(NFA). The principal results then state: (i) U0(NFA) is
equivalent to PA; (ii) U1(NFA) is equivalent to RA<!; (iii) U(NFA) is equivalent to RA< 0 . Thus
U(NFA) is proof-theoretically equivalent to predicative analysis. c© 2000 Elsevier Science B.V.
All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The concept of unfolding of a schematic formal systems S was introduced in Fefer-
man [6] in order to answer the following question:
Given a schematic system S, which operations and predicates, and which princi-
ples concerning them, ought to be accepted if one has accepted S?
The basic system NFA of classical non-nitist arithmetic is paradigmatic for such S; it
is given by the following axioms, where as usual we write x0 for Sc(x):
(1) x0 6=0.
(2) Pd(x0)= x.
(3) P(0)^ (8x)[P(x)!P(x0)] ! (8x)P(x).
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Here P is a free predicate variable, and the intention is to use the induction scheme
(3) in a wider sense than is usual. Denote by L0 the language of NFA. The usual
narrow sense in which (3) is to be applied is that we may substitute for P any formula
B of L0 with distinguished free variable x. A wider sense is that we may substitute
for P in (3) any formula B of any language L extending L0 whose basic notions one
accepts as meaningful and for which concomitant axioms are provided. But this is still
just a special case of the general rule of substitution
(Subst) A[P])A[B=P]
for any formulas A; B of L. In particular, as one unfolds NFA, its language and
corresponding axioms expand and the class of formulas A; B to which one may apply
(Subst) expands accordingly. This does not mean that the notions to which one may
apply induction throughout mathematics are limited to those appearing in the unfolding
of NFA. Rather, that only tells us which notions and principles are implicit in accepting
NFA, i.e., which ought to be accepted if one accepts NFA at all. The acceptance of
notions and principles beyond that, such as those coming from set theory or other
conceptual arenas, must in each case be based on essentially new considerations.
Speaking of set theory, other formal systems which have natural schematic formaliza-
tions in the present sense are those of Zermelo and Zermelo{Fraenkel. For the former,
the separation scheme is given by
(Sep) (9b) (8x)[x2 b$ x2 a^P(x)].
Similarly, we may reformulate replacement in ZF in schematic terms using a free binary
predicate variable R. Alternatively (and not necessarily equivalently) we may formulate
it in a natural way using a free partial function variable f, as follows:
(Rep) (8x2 a)f(x) #! (9b) (8y)[y2 b$ (9x2 a)f(x)=y];
which simply says that the range of f on a exists. For further discussion and examples
of schematic systems using free predicate and=or partial function variables, in the wider
sense indicated here, see [6].
The concept of unfolding applies to any schematic systems S. Its denition is given
rst in a restricted form U0(S) and then in a full form U(S); consideration of the
latter leads to a natural intermediate form U1(S). The system U0(S) is called the
operational unfolding of S; it tells us which operations from and to individuals, and
which principles concerning them, ought to be accepted if one has accepted S. It is
obtained by adding free partial function variables and partial function and functional
constants which are introduced successively from the basic operations of S by schemata
of explicit denition (ED) and least xed point recursion (LFP). The principles that
are added concerning these are simply the equations they are intended to satisfy.
The full unfolding U(S) is also given in operational terms. It tells us, further, which
operations on and to predicates, and which principles concerning them, ought to be
accepted if one has accepted S. This will depend to begin with on which logical
operations, viewed as operations on predicates, are accepted as basic in S. In the case
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of (classical) NFA these may be taken as the operations of negation, conjunction and
universal quantication. If the initial system S is, for example, some form of nitist
arithmetic or constructive non-nitist arithmetic, other choices of basic operations on
predicates will be dictated. Once supplied with a choice of such basic logical operations,
the further operations (and associated principles) on and to predicates in U(S) are
generated again by (ED) and (LFP) schemata. In addition, we have an operation of
Join, specic to the case of predicates, which allows us to pass in a canonical way from
a sequence of n-ary predicates to an (n+ 1)-ary predicate. The intermediate unfolding
U1(S) is obtained in the same way as U(S), except that Join is not applied here.
The main results of this paper characterize proof-theoretically these three unfolding
systems of NFA, as follows, where  denotes proof-theoretical equivalence (and where
in each case we have conservation with respect to suitable classes of formulas of the
system on the left over the system on the right):
I. U0(NFA)  PA.
II. U1(NFA)  RA<!.
III. U(NFA)  RA< 0 .
Here, as usual, RA< denotes the system of ramied analysis in levels < , and  0 is
the so-called Feferman{Schutte ordinal, which has been identied as the limit of the
predicatively provable ordinals. Thus U(NFA) is equivalent to predicative analysis.
For related earlier work and the historical background to the concept of unfolding,
as well as for some directions of possible further work, see [6].
2. The operational unfolding of a schematically presented formal system S
It is the purpose of this section to dene the operational unfolding U0(S) of a
schematically presented formal system S. The precise denition of the terms and axioms
for explicit denition (ED) and least xed point recursion (LFP) to be used in U0(S)
is given by formalization of the generalization of recursion theory (g.r.t.) to arbitrary
structures A due to Feferman [4, 5]. An alternative but essentially equivalent form of
g.r.t. is due to Moschovakis [11], and both have their roots in Platek’s thesis [12]. For
our purposes here, the structures to which this is to be applied are of the form
A=(A; F0; : : : ; Fn);
where A is the domain of A and F0; : : : ; Fn are objects of type level 62 over A,
i.e. where each of these is either an individual of A or a partial function or partial
monotonic functional of type level 2 of appropriate arity; see below for details con-
cerning the type structure. For simplicity, we are only considering one-sorted structures
A here, however, the treatment of many-sorted structures is straightforward. The basic
structure to consider in the case of arithmetic is of course (N; Sc; Pd; 0), where N is the
set of natural numbers and Sc and Pd denote the successor and predecessor operation,
respectively.
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The terms considered below are either individual terms, partial function terms or par-
tial functional terms. Accordingly, their types can be divided into three
classes:
Typ 1.  denotes the type of individuals from A, and we let  range over the types of
nite (possibly empty) sequences of individuals.
Typ 2. 0; 0 range over the types of partial functions of the form  ~!, and again we
let 0 range over the types of nite sequences of such.
Typ 3. (0;  ~!) is used for partial functional types. These reduce to partial function
types in case that 0 is empty.
The terms (r; s; t; : : :) are now inductively generated as follows, where we use the
notation r :  in order to indicate that the term r is of type .
Tm 1. We have innitely many variables x; y; z; a; b; c; : : : of type .
Tm 2. For each partial function type 0 we have innitely many partial function vari-
ables f; g; h; : : : of type 0.
Tm 3. For each basic functional of the structure A we are given functional constants
Fi of appropriate functional type.
Tm 4. Cond(r; s) : (0; ; ;  ~!) for r; s : (0;  ~!).
Tm 5. r( s; t ) :  for r : (0;  ~!), s : 0 and t : .
Tm 6. ( f; x: t) : (0;  ~!) for f : 0, x :  and t : .
Tm 7. LFP(f; x: t) : ( ~!) for f :  ~!, x :  and t : .
The formulas (A; B; C; : : :) of U0(S) are inductively given by:
Fm 1. The atomic formulas are (r= s), r # and P(t) for r; s : , t :  and P a free
relation symbol.
Fm 2. If A and B are formulas, then so also are :A, (A^B) and (8x)A.
Observe that we do not allow quantication over partial function variables. As we base
all our systems on classical logic, we assume that the remaining logical connectives
and quantiers are dened as usual. However, let us mention that the results estab-
lished in this article also hold for the corresponding systems based on intuitionistic
logic.
In the following, we write t[ f; x] to indicate a sequence f; x of free variables possibly
appearing in the term t; however, t may contain other free variables than those shown
by using this bracket notation. The meaning of A[ f; x] is analogous.
The logic of U0(S) is the classical logic of partial terms LPT of Beeson [1] for
the individual sort , and usual (quantier free) predicate logic for the other sorts.
We recall that LPT embodies strictness axioms saying that all subterms of a dened
compound term are dened as well. Moreover, if (s= t) holds then both s and t are
dened, and s is dened provided P(s) holds. As usual, one denes a partial equality
relation between individual type terms by setting
s ’ t := s #_ t #! s= t:
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We are now ready to spell out the axioms of U0(S), which essentially just bring out
the obvious meaning of the terms specied above.
Ax 1. The axioms of S, including the dening axioms for the Fi’s.
Ax 2. Cond(s; t)( f; x; y; y) ’ s( f; x)^y 6= z!Cond(s; t)( f; x; y; z) ’ t( f; x).
Ax 3. ( f; x: t[ f; x])( f; x) ’ t[ f; x].
Ax 4. For s  LFP(f; x: t[f; x]) we take:
(i) s( x) ’ t[s; x],
(ii) (8 x)(f( x) ’ t[f; x])! (8 x)(s( x) #!f( x)= s( x)).
Finally, crucial for the formulation of U0(S) is the predicate substitution rule, which
reads as follows:
(Subst) A[P])A[B=P]:
In the conclusion of this rule, B is an arbitrary formula and A[B=P] denotes the formula
A[P] with each subformula P(t) replaced by (9 x)(t ’ x^B( x)). This completes the
description of the system U0(S).
Before we turn to the denition of the intermediate and full unfolding of S, we very
briey address the proof-theoretic strength of U0(NFA). Recall that NFA was presented
by axioms (1){(3) where (1) and (2) are the axioms for Sc and Pd, while (3) is the
schematic axiom of induction; these are what take the place of Ax 1 above in the case
of S=NFA.
3. The proof-theoretic strength of U0(NFA)
In this section we give a short sketch for the proof-theoretic equivalence of U0(NFA)
and Peano arithmetic PA. 1 Hence, in the sequel  denotes the basic type of natural
numbers.
As to the lower bound, we rst have to bootstrap U0(NFA) and show that the
primitive recursive functions can be introduced there. This is of course straightforward
by making use of LFP recursion. For notational convenience, let us write
fif y=0 then s[ f; x] else t[ f; x]g for Cond( f; x:s;  f; x: t)( f; x; y; 0):
To show closure under primitive recursion in U0(NFA), let r and s be terms of function
type taking number type arguments ( x) and (x; y; z), respectively, and assume that r
and s have been shown to be total in U0(NFA). Let t be given by
t :=LFP(f; x; y:fif y=0 then r( x) else s( x; Pd(y); f( x; Pd(y)))g):
Then one obtains by axiom Ax 4(i) of U0(NFA) that
t( x; 0) ’ r( x) and t( x; y0) ’ s( x; y; t( x; y)):
1 To be precise, we use a conservative extension of PA in which the predicate symbol P may occur in
formulas in the induction schema.
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One then establishes by induction on y that t( x; y) #. Here one has to apply the sub-
stitution rule to the schematic form of the induction axiom of NFA. Hence, we can
dene all primitive recursive functions in U0(NFA); of course, by (Subst), we have
complete induction on the natural numbers available in U0(NFA) for arbitrary formu-
las and, therefore, we see that Peano arithmetic PA in its usual non-schematic form is
contained in U0(NFA).
For the upper bound we make use of a direct embedding of U0(NFA) into PA.
Basically, we let partial function variables of type  ~! range over indices of partial
recursive functions. It is then easy to nd (indices of) partial recursive function(al)s
serving as appropriate interpretations for the function(al) terms of U0(NFA). In partic-
ular, closure under the LFP schema is guaranteed in the usual way as follows. Suppose
f; x: t[f;~x ] is already given to us as a partial recursive functional, possibly depending
on additional parameters. Then we dene (uniformly in n) a sequence gn of partial
recursive functions by
g0 := the empty function;
gn+1 :=  x: t[gn; x]:
Now we can take g :=
S
n2N gn as our interpretation of LFP(f; x: t[f; x ]). We have that
g is partial recursive, and the usual argument shows that it has the required properties,
cf. [4, 5] for more details. Finally, the substitution rule (Subst) is easily seen to be
validated under our embedding and, hence, we are in a position to state the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. U0(NFA) is proof-theoretically equivalent to PA and conservatively ex-
tends PA.
This concludes our brief sketch of the equivalence of U0(NFA) and PA.
4. The full and intermediate unfolding of a schematically presented formal system S
It is the aim of the present section to dene the full unfolding U(S) of a schemati-
cally presented formal system S and its natural restriction U1(S). Whereas U0(S) ad-
dresses the question of which operations on A ought to be accepted given a schematic
system S for a structure A=(A; F0; : : : ; Fn), the central question concerning U1(S)
and U(S) can be stated as follows: which operations on and to predicates | and
which principles concerning them | ought to be accepted if one has accepted S?
Let us now stepwise describe U(S) and its subsystem U1(S). For that purpose, we
introduce for each natural number n a new atomic type n of n-ary predicates on A.
Hence, our basic types now include  and n for each n2N. The type structure to be
considered for the full unfolding is spelled out below. Crucial is the presence of new
function types of the form  ~!n, which will allow the denition of operations from
individuals to predicates by means of least xed point recursion. Denitions of this
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kind are very natural as we will see below; for example, in the unfolding of NFA one
may dene initial segments of the hyperarithmetic hierarchy simply by LFP recursion
from numbers to predicates.
Typ 1. The basic types are  and n for each n2N. We let ;  range over these basic
types, and  over types of nite sequences of objects of basic type.
Typ 2. We have partial function types of the two forms  ~! and  ~!n. As above, we
let 0; 0 range over the former and, in addition, ;  range over partial function
types of both forms. Sequence notation is used as before.
Typ 3. (0;  ~!) and (;  ~!n) are our partial functional types.
Note that in Typ 2 and Typ 3 we do not allow the use of predicate arguments or
arguments of type  ~!n when dening function(al)s whose values are of type , i.e. are
individuals. These are allowed in Typ 3 when dening functionals of type (;  ~!n); in
particular, when  is empty, such functionals reduce to partial functions from individuals
and predicates to predicates. The reason for the restriction of functional types with
values of type  is that in some sense individuals and operations on individuals are
being treated as conceptually prior to operations on predicates; in particular, we want
schemas to generate operations from individuals to individuals which do not depend on
what predicates are available. However, we will see that we can prove more functions
from individuals to individuals to be total in the presence of suitable predicates. 2
The term building operations Tm 1{7 are now extended to the larger type structure
in a straightforward manner as follows.
Tm 1. For each basic type  we have innitely many variables of type . In the fol-
lowing, we usually reserve x; y; z; a; b; c; : : : as variables of type  and X n; Y n,
Zn; : : : as variables of type n; we omit the superscript ‘n’ if it is given by the
context.
Tm 2. For each partial function type  we have innitely many partial function vari-
ables f; g; h; : : : of type .
Tm 3. For each basic functional of the structure A we are given functional constants
Fi of appropriate functional type.
Tm 4. Cond(r; s) : (0; ; ;  ~!) for r; s : (0;  ~!);
Cond(r; s) : (; ; ;  ~!n) for r; s : (;  ~!n).
Tm 5. r( s; t) :  for r : (0;  ~!), s : 0 and t : ;
r( s; t) : n for r : (;  ~!n), s :  and t : .
Tm 6. ( f; x: t) : (0;  ~!) for f : 0, x :  and t : ;
( f; x: t) : (;  ~!n) for f : , x :  and t : n.
Tm 7. LFP(f; x: t) : ( ~!) for f :  ~!, x :  and t : .
2 We have considered the alternative possibility in the denition of U(S) and U1(S) of treating individuals
and predicates on a par, without the restrictions taken here in Typ 1{Typ 3. This would make sense from
the computational point of view of [4], if not the logical point of view. It is an open question whether
the upper bounds obtained in Sections 5 and 6 for U(NFA), resp. U1(NFA), still hold in this unrestricted
formulation.
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The term forming operations Tm 1{7 are now extended in order to incorporate new
operations on and to predicates, namely Eq (equality), PrP (free predicate symbol P),
Inv (inverse image), Neg (negation), Conj (conjunction), Un (universal quantication)
and Join (disjoint union). The operations Neg, Conj and Un are appropriate if one
accepts classical predicate calculus, as, for example, one does in non-nitist arithmetic.
Other systems (e.g. nitist or constructive arithmetic) may call for other choices of
basic logical operations.
Tm 8. Eq : 2.
Tm 9. PrP : n for P n-ary predicate letter.
Tm 10. Inv(s; t1; : : : ; tm) : n for s : m, t1; : : : ; tm :  ~! and  of length n.
Tm 11. Neg(t) : n for t : n.
Tm 12. Conj(s; t) : n for s; t : n.
Tm 13. Un(t) : n for t : n+1.
Tm 14. Join(t) : n+1 for t :  ~!n.
The formulas of U(S) are built in the same way as the formulas of U0(S), but now
taking into account new atomic formulas involving predicate type terms.
Fm 1. We have the atomic formulas:
(i) (r= s); r # and P(t) for r; s : ; t :  and P a free relation symbol;
(ii) (r= s); r # and (t1; : : : ; tn)2 r for r; s : n and t1; : : : ; tn : .
Fm 2. If A and B are formulas, then so also are :A; (A^B) and (8x)A.
It is crucial to observe here that we do not allow quantication over predicate
variables. Accordingly, the logic used for the sort n is a quantier-free version of the
logic of partial terms LPT .
The axioms of U(S) include Ax 1{4 of U0(S), now extended to the new language.
First Ax 5, we do not distinguish between predicates which are extensionally identical;
i.e. it is only how predicates behave on their arguments that counts. In addition, the
axioms for the new predicate forming operations are spelled out in the expected manner
in Ax 6 {12.
Ax 5. (8 x)[( x)2X $ ( x)2Y ]!X =Y .
Ax 6. Eq # ^ (8x; y)[(x; y)2Eq$ x=y].
Ax 7. PrP # ^ (8 x)[( x)2PrP$P( x)].
Ax 8. Inv(X; f1; : : : ; fm) # ^ (8 x)[( x)2 Inv(X; f1; : : : ; fm)$ (f1( x); : : : ; fm( x))2X ].
Ax 9. Neg(X ) # ^ (8 x)[( x)2Neg(X )$ ( x) =2 X ].
Ax 10. Conj(X; Y ) # ^ (8 x)[( x)2Conj(X; Y )$ ( x)2X ^ ( x)2Y ].
Ax 11. Un(X ) # ^ (8 x)[( x)2Un(X )$ (8y)(( x; y)2X )].
Ax 12. For f :  ~! n we take
(8y)f(y) # ! Join(f) # ^ (8 x; y)[( x; y)2 Join(f)$ ( x)2f(y)]:
Further, U(S) contains the substitution rule (Subst), i.e. A[P])A[B=P], where now
B denotes an arbitrary formula of U(S), but A[P] is required to be a formula in
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the language of U0(S). This last restriction is due to the fact that predicate terms
in general depend on the predicate parameter P. Finally, we obtain an intermediate
unfolding system U1(S) by leaving out Ax 12, i.e. U1(S) is just U(S) without Join.
The full unfolding U(S) described here is slightly dierent from the one given in [6].
There predicates are understood as (total) propositional functions, taking individuals as
arguments and yielding propositions as values. For the latter, a type  of propositions
is presupposed together with a predicate T (x) expressing that the proposition x is true,
thus providing an approach to predicates via Frege structures. As pointed out in [6],
the Frege-type approach to predicates does not allow one to single out the role of join,
and since we are interested in the intermediate unfolding U1(S) here as well, we have
assumed types for n-ary predicates as basic.
The rest of this paper is devoted to establishing the proof-theoretic equivalence of
U(NFA) with RA< 0 as well as U1(NFA) with RA<!.
5. The proof-theoretic strength of U(NFA)
In this section we compute the exact proof-theoretic strength of U(S) for the case
that S is the basic schematic system of non-nitist arithmetic NFA. As before we let 
denote the basic type of natural numbers and, in addition, we write Pr instead of PrP ,
since P is the only free predicate letter needed.
In Section 5.1 we show that transnite induction is derivable in U(NFA) below the
Feferman{Schutte ordinal  0 by carrying through a detailed wellordering proof; this
is used to reduce RA< 0 to U(NFA). Then in Section 5.2 we give the denition of a
suitable version of Peano arithmetic with ordinals plus substitution rule, PA+
+(Subst),
which was introduced in [16]; it is shown in [16] that PA+
+(Subst) has proof-theoretic
ordinal  0. Finally, we show in Section 5.3 how to model U(NFA) in PA+
 + (Subst),
thereby establishing RA< 0 as an upper bound of U(NFA).
5.1. Lower bounds
The aim of this section is to establish the Feferman{Schutte ordinal  0 as a lower
bound of U(NFA). For that purpose we presuppose a primitive recursive standard
wellordering  of order type  0 with least element 0 and eld N. We further assume
familiarity with the Veblen functions ’ (or ’); cf. [15] or [13] for details. When
working in formal theories, we identify ordinal operations with their primitive recursive
analogues acting on codes of our notation system; we also identify primitive recursive
relations with the U0(NFA) terms which represent their characteristic functions. If A is
a formula with designated free variable x of type  and s : , then we dene as usual:
Prog(A) := (8x)[(8y  x)A(y)!A(x)];
TI(s; A) :=Prog(A)! (8x  s)A(x):
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If we want to stress the relevant induction variable of the formula A, we sometimes
write Prog(x:A(x)) instead of Prog(A); the expression TI(s; x:A(x)) reads similarly.
Moreover, if t : 1, then we often use the notation Prog(t) instead of Prog(x:x2 t),
and similarly for TI(s; t).
Let (n)n2N denote a canonical fundamental sequence for  0 given by 0 =! and
n+1 =’n0. It is our aim to establish TI(n; P) for each n2N within U(NFA). Crucial
in the argument below is the following: as soon as we have shown TI(!; P), and if
a suitable jump hierarchy above P exists below ! + 1, then we are able to deduce
TI(’0; P). Hence, our rst task is to show how arithmetic jump hierarchies can be
built uniformly within U(NFA).
Let A(X; a; y) be an arithmetic formula with at most X; a; y free and X : 2. Then
the A jump hierarchy up to < 0 starting with P is given set-theoretically by the
following transnite recursion:
Y0 := fm :P(m)g;
Ya := fm :A(Y a; a; m)g (0 a );
where Y a denotes the set f(m; b) : b a^m2Ybg. We now show how to represent
(Ya)a  in U(NFA) provided that we have already established TI(; P). First of all,
by making use of the predicate axioms Ax 6{11 only, we can nd a term rA : (2;  ~!)
so that U(NFA) proves
rA(X; a) # ^ (8y)(y2 rA(X; a)$ A(X; a; y)):
Further, there exists a term s : ( ~!1; ;  ~!1) which provably satises
s(f; a; x) ’ fif x a then f(x) else ;g;
where ; denotes a canonical term of type 1 for the empty set. Finally, let hierA of
type ( ~!1) be given by least xed point recursion as follows:
hierA := LFP(f; a:fif a=0 then Pr else rA(Join(x :s(f; a; x)); a)g):
Since we have assumed TI(; P), we can derive by the substitution rule (Subst) that
TI(; a:hierA(a) #). Since it is easily shown that Prog(a:hierA(a) #), we can conclude
(8a )hierA(a) # :
Hence, we have established the existence of the A jump hierarchy below  starting
with P in U(NFA), and its dening properties are directly provable there.
In order to carry through our wellordering proof we make use of a very specic
jump formula A(X; a; y), which is given in [15, pp. 184]. Before we can give an
explicit denition of A, we need some preparations. First, let h and e be primitive
recursive auxiliary functions on our ordinal notations, which satisfy
 h(0)= e(0)= 0; h(!a)= 0 and e(!a)= a;
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 if a=!a1 +    + !an for more than one summand so that an4    4 a1, then
h(a)=!a1 +   + !an−1 and e(a)= an.
In addition, let us dene a kind of jump operator J, which is given by the following
arithmetic denition:
J(X; a) := (8y) ((8xy) (x2X )! (8xy + a) (x2X )):
Finally, the jump formula A(X; a; y) is given by
A(X; a; y) := (8z) (h(a)4 z a!J((X )z ; ’(e(a); y))):
Here X is of type 2 and a formula t 2 (X )z must be read as (t; z)2X . By the consid-
erations above, we have a term hierA :  ~!1 which provably in U(NFA) represents the
A jump hierarchy starting from P below , provided we have previously established
TI(; P) in U(NFA).
The following statement is crucial in the wellordering proof for U(NFA). It is
Lemma 9 in [15, p. 186], re-written in the present notation, and its proof, which
we omit, follows exactly the same steps as in [15].
Lemma 2. Assume that TI(; P) is provable in U(NFA) for an ordinal  less than
 0. Then we have that U(NFA) proves
(8a)[0 a ^ (8b a)Prog(hierA(b))!Prog(hierA(a))]:
The ground is now prepared for the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 3. U(NFA) proves TI(n; P) for each natural number n.
Proof. The claim is established by metamathematical induction on n. The case n=0 is
trivial, since TI(!; P) is certainly provable in U(NFA). For the step from n to n+1 we
assume that TI(n; P) is derivable in U(NFA). By making use of the usual wellordering
proof of PA, this readily implies that U(NFA) also proves
TI(!n + 1; P): (1)
Hence, according to our discussion above, we have the A jump hierarchy below !n+1
available in U(NFA), i.e. U(NFA) proves
(8a!n + 1)hierA(a) # : (2)
In the following, we work informally in U(NFA) and we want to derive TI(’n0; P).
For that purpose let us assume Prog(P). Then the previous lemma readily entails
(8a!n + 1)[(8b a)Prog(hierA(b))!Prog(hierA(a))]: (3)
From (3) and an application of (Subst) to (1) we can derive
Prog(hierA(!n)): (4)
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In particular, (4) entails that 02 hierA(!n), and since h(!n)= 0 and e(!n)= n, we
have that
(8z!n)J(hierA(z); ’n0): (5)
Substituting z=0 this means J(P; ’n0), which implies
(8x’n0)P(x): (6)
All together we have established TI(n+1; P) as desired.
Corollary 4. U(NFA) proves TI(; P) for each ordinal  less than  0.
From this corollary we can conclude as usual:
Corollary 5. (01-CA)< 0 is contained in U(NFA).
For an alternative way of climbing up the  0 ladder we refer the reader to Fefer-
man [3, 2]. There it is shown how to make use of the ordinary jump hierarchy in a
wellordering proof below  0.
We have established (01-CA)< 0 or, equivalently, RA< 0 as lower bound of the full
unfolding system U(NFA) for non-nitist arithmetic NFA. The next two sections are
devoted to proving the converse direction, namely that RA< 0 is also an upper bound
for U(NFA).
5.2. Peano arithmetic with ordinals and the bar rule
In this section we introduce the theory PA+
 + (Subst) of Peano arithmetic with
ordinals plus substitution (or bar) rule, which { among other things { is analyzed
proof-theoretically in [16]. This theory will be used in the next section in order to
provide an upper bound for the system U(NFA).
Fixed point theories over Peano arithmetic with ordinals were introduced in [10].
They have previously been applied in the proof-theoretic analysis of systems of explicit
mathematics with the non-constructive  operator in an essential way, cf. for example
[7{9].
In the following, we let L denote the usual language of rst order arithmetic with
function and relation symbols for all primitive recursive functions and relations. We
also assume that L includes the unary free relation symbol P. If X is an n -ary
relation symbol distinct from P, then L(X ) denotes the extension of L by X . An
L(X ) formula is called X positive if each occurrence of X in it is positive. We call
those X positive formulas which contain at most x= x1; : : : ; xn free, inductive operator
forms; A(X; x) ranges over such forms. Observe that the relation symbol P can have
positive and negative occurrences in an inductive operator form A(X; x).
Now, we extend L to a new rst order language L
 by adding a new sort of
ordinal variables (; ; ; : : :), new binary relation symbols < and = for the less-than
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and equality relations on ordinals 3 and an (n + 1) -ary relation symbol PA for each
inductive operator form A(X; x) for which X is n -ary.
The number terms of L
 (r; s; t; : : :) are the number terms of L; the ordinal terms
of L
 are the ordinal variables of L
. The formulas of L
 (A; B; C; : : :) are inductively
dened as follows:
Fm 1. If R is an n -ary relation symbol of L, then R( s) is an atomic formula of L
.
Fm 2. The formulas (<); (= ) and PA(; s) are atomic formulas of L
.
Fm 3. If A and B are L
 formulas, then so also are :A; (A^B); (9x)A and (8x)A.
Fm 4. If A is an L
 formula, then so also are (9<)A; (8<)A; (9)A and (8)A.
The remaining logical connectives are dened as usual. For every L
 formula A
we write A to denote the L
 formula which is obtained by replacing all unbounded
ordinal quantiers (Q) in A by (Q<). Additional abbreviations are
PA( s) := PA(; s); P
<
A ( s) := (9<)PA( s); PA( s) := (9)PA( s):
We introduce several classes of L
 formulas, which will be important for the ordinal
part of our xed point theories. The 
0 formulas are the L
 formulas which do not
contain unbounded ordinal quantiers; the 
 [
] formulas are the L
 formulas
which do not contain positive universal [existential] and negative existential [universal]
ordinal quantiers. The union of 
 and 
 is denoted by r
.
We are now ready to give the exact formulation of the theory PA+
. It is based on the
usual two-sorted predicate calculus with equality and classical logic. The non-logical
axioms of PA+
 are divided into the following six groups:
Ax 1. The axioms of Peano arithmetic PA with the exception of complete induction
on the natural numbers.
Ax 2. For all inductive operator forms A(X; x):
PA( s)$A(P<A ; s):
Ax 3. 
 Reection axioms. For all 
 formulas A:
A! (9)A:
Ax 4. Linearity axioms:
 6< ^ (<^ <! <)^ (<_ = _ <):
Ax 5. Formula induction on the natural numbers. For all L
 formulas A(x):
A(0)^ (8x)(A(x)!A(x0))! (8x)A(x):
Ax 6. 
 induction on the ordinals. For all 
 formulas A():
(8)[(8<)A()!A()]! (8)A():
3 In general, it will be clear from the context whether < and = denote the less-than and equality relations
on the nonnegative integers or on the ordinals.
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Remark 6. From the inductive operator and 
 reection axioms one can easily deduce
that the 
 formulas PA describe xed points of the inductive operator form A(X; x).
Crucial for the embedding of U(NFA) below is an adequate substitution or bar rule,
which we formulate as follows:
(Subst) A[P])A[B=P].
Here A is a formula in the language L and B is allowed to be an arbitrary L

formula. A[B=P] just means A[P] with each occurrence of P(t) replaced by B(t).
The following theorem about the proof-theoretic strength of PA+
+(Subst) is estab-
lished in [16]. It will be used in the upper bound computation of U(NFA) in the next
section.
Theorem 7. PA+
 + (Subst) is proof-theoretically equivalent to RA< 0 and conserva-
tively extends RA< 0 with respect to arithmetic statements.
We nish this section by mentioning that this theorem still holds if we allow induc-
tion on the ordinals for formulas in r
, i.e. formulas which are either 
 or 
, cf.
Strahm [16] for details.
5.3. Upper bounds
In this paragraph we establish an embedding of U(NFA) into PA+
+(Subst), thereby
showing the equivalence of U(NFA) and RA< 0 . Since types of the form ( 0;  ~! ) do
not involve predicate types, the corresponding terms can be interpreted in the very same
way as in Section 3 for U0(NFA). The treatment of the predicate part of U(NFA) is
much more involved. Basically, function variables of type ( ~!n) are also interpreted
as partial recursive functions, but the ranges and hence denedness conditions for such
functions will be more complicated, as we will see below.
In the sequel, we make use of the usual primitive recursive coding machinery: h: : :i is
a standard primitive recursive function for forming n-tuples ht1; : : : ; tni; Seq denotes the
primitive recursive set of sequence numbers; lh(t) denotes the length of (the sequence
coded by)t; Seqn(t) abbreviates Seq(t)^ lh(t)= n; (t)i is the ith component of (the
sequence coded by) t for i<lh(t), in particular, t= h(t)0; : : : ; (t)lh(t) :− 1i for sequence
numbers t; we write (t)i;j instead of ((t)i)j;? denotes the usual primitive recursive
operation of sequence concatenation; nally, if x= x1; : : : ; xn then we write h xi for
hx1; : : : ; xni.
We start o by inductively dening a collection  of (non-unique) codes for the
predicates of U(NFA) together with an 2 relation which determines the extension for
each such code. Since a direct inductive denition of  and 2 would involve negative
occurrences of 2 , we also have to dene a complementary relation 2 for 2 in order
to t into the framework for positive inductive denitions which is available in PA+
.
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We use the following codes for n-ary predicates:
 h0; 2i for the binary predicate Eq,
 h1; 1i for the unary predicate Pr,
 h2; n; a; f1; : : : ; fmi for the n-ary predicate Inv(a; f1; : : : ; fm),
 h3; n; ai for the n-ary predicate Neg(a),
 h4; n; a; bi for the n-ary predicate Conj(a; b),
 h5; n; ai for the n-ary predicate Un(a),
 h6; n; fi for the n-ary predicate Join(f).
Now is possible to give a simultaneous inductive denition for , 2 and 2, which
is readily encoded into a single one in order to t into L
. The dening condition for
(a) is given by the disjunction of the following clauses:
(i) a= h0; 2i,
(ii) a= h1; 1i,
(iii) Seq(a)^ (a)0 = 2^ lh(a)= (a)2;1 + 3^((a)2),
(iv) Seq3(a)^ (a)0 = 3^ (a)2;1 = (a)1 ^((a)2),
(v) Seq4(a)^ (a)0 = 4^ (a)2;1 = (a)1 ^ (a)3;1 = (a)1 ^((a)2)^((a)3),
(vi) Seq3(a)^ (a)0 = 5^ (a)2;1 = (a)1 + 1^((a)2),
(vii) Seq3(a)^ (a)0 = 6^ (a)1 > 0^
(8x) (9b)[f(a)2g(x)= b^ (b)1 = (a)1 :− 1^(b)]:
The clauses for (x2 a) are straightforward but rather lengthy to spell out. Observe that
in clause (iii) references to 2 are needed. We encode multiple arguments of a predicate
a into a single one by making use of sequence numbering as usual. Summing up, the
dening clauses for the relation (x2 a) read as follows:
(i) a= h0; 2i ^ Seq2(x)^ (x)0 = (x)1,
(ii) a= h1; 1i ^ Seq1(x)^P((x)0),
(iii) Seq(a)^ (a)0 = 2^ lh(a) = (a)2;1 + 3 ^ ((a)2)^ Seq(a)1 (x) ^
hf(a)3g((x)0; : : : ; (x)lh(x) :− 1); : : : ; f(a)lh(a) :− 1g((x)0; : : : ; (x)lh(x) :− 1)i 2 (a)2,
(iv) Seq3(a)^ (a)0 = 3^ (a)2;1 = (a)1 ^((a)2)^ Seq(a)1 (x)^ x 2 (a)2,
(v) Seq4(a)^ (a)0 = 4^ (a)2;1 = (a)1 ^ (a)3;1 = (a)1 ^((a)2)^((a)3)^ Seq(a)1 (x)
^ x2 (a)3 ^ x2 (a)4,
(vi) Seq3(a)^ (a)0 = 5^ (a)2;1 = (a)1 + 1^((a)2)^ Seq(a)1 (x)^ (8y)[x?hyi 2 (a)2],
(vii) Seq3(a)^ (a)0 = 6^ (a)1>0^ (8x)(9b)[f(a)2g(x)= b^ (b)1 = (a)1 :− 1^(b)]
^ Seq(a)1 (x)^ h(x)0; : : : ; (x)(a)1 :− 2i 2 f(a)2g((x)(a)1 :− 1).
The clauses for x 2 a are similar and, therefore, we omit them. All together we have
convinced ourselves that , 2 and 2 can be generated by a (simultaneous) positive
inductive denition. Hence, , 2 and 2 exist in PA+
 as slices of a suitable xed
point, and the above dening conditions are derivable there. Recall that ; 2 and 2
are 
, whereas the corresponding stage predicates ;2 and 2  are 
0 .
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Observe that it does not follow from the xed point property alone that 2 and 2
are complementary on predicate codes. However, this property can be shown by 
0
induction on the ordinals. This is the content of the following lemma.
Lemma 8. We have that PA+
 proves
(8a) [(a)! (8x)(Seq(a)1 (x)! (x2 a$: (x 2 a)))]:
Proof. We rst notice that the extension of a predicate code is fully determined at the
rst stage it gets into . Formally, one easily establishes the following statement by

0 induction on :
(8<)(8a) [(a)! (8x)(Seq(a)1 (x)! ((x2a$ x2 a)^ (x 2 a$ x 2 a)))]:
Now the claim of the lemma is immediate from
(8a) [(a)! (8x)(Seq(a)1 (x)! (x2 a$: (x 2 a)))];
which is readily shown by 
0 induction on the ordinals as well.
In the following n(a) means that a is a code for a n-ary predicate, i.e. n(a)
abbreviates (a)^ (a)1 = n. Similarly, n(a) expresses that a codes an n-ary predicate
on stage ; observe that n(a) is a 


0 statement of L
. Equality between predicates
must be understood extensionally in the sequel; accordingly, we dene
a=n b :=n(a)^n(b)^ (8 x) (h xi 2 a$h xi 2 b):
It is our aim next to show how terms involving predicate types can be interpreted in
order to satisfy their dening axioms, provably in PA+
. As we have already indicated
earlier, we let variables f of type ( ~! n) range over indices of partial recursive
functions, but denedness for such functions must now be understood with respect to
, namely f( x) # means (9y)[ffg( x) ’ y^n(y)], in short n(ffg( x)).
The interpretation of U(NFA) expressions in the partial recursive functions is obvious
except for terms of the form LFP(f; x: t) with f :  ~! n, x :  and t : n. Moreover,
terms can always be interpreted in such a way that testing for denedness with respect
to  is delayed to the end of the evaluation procedure. The treatment of LFP terms
is rather delicate and requires some specic monotonicity notions, which we want to
introduce now. We set for all natural numbers a; b; f; g:
an b :=n(a)! a=n b;
a<n b := (8<)(an b);
f ~! n g := (8 x)(ffg( x)nfgg( x));
f< ~! n g := (8<)(f ~! n g):
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We often omit the subscripts ‘n’ and ‘ ~! n’ if they are given by the context. In ad-
dition, we use the vector notation as in a b and f g with its usual componentwise
meaning.
Let us now assume that we are given a term t[ f; a; u] : n with all free variables
shown, f :  ~! , a : , and u variables not involving predicate types. 4 We further
assume that t[ f; a; u] has already been given a suitable recursion-theoretic interpretation,
and we identify t with its interpretation if we are working informally in PA+
. Then
we call t progressively monotonic (provably in PA+
), if PA
+

 proves
f< g^ a< b! t[ f; a; u] t[ g; b; u]:5
In the sequel we abbreviate \progressively monotonic" to \p-monotonic". For example,
it is easy to see that the term Join(f) for f :  ~! n is p-monotonic. Indeed, assume
that f< g and Join(f) is a predicate on level ; then we have (essentially by
Ax 2 of PA+
) for all x that ffg( x) is a predicate on level less than  and, hence,
ffg( x)= fgg( x) by our assumption; this entails Join(f)= Join(g) as desired. On the
other hand, a term such as f( x) is obviously not p-monotonic.
Our aim now is to give a straightforward recursion-theoretic interpretation of terms
LFP(f; x: t[f; x]) :  ~! n for previously interpreted terms t[f; x] which are p-monoto-
nic in the above dened sense. The key in the proof below is the fact that induction
on the ordinals is available for 
 statements in PA+
.
Lemma 9. Assume that t[f; x] : n with f :  ~! n and x : ; possibly having other free
variables; is provably p-monotonic in PA+
. Then there exists a recursion-theoretic in-
terpretation e; primitive recursively depending on these other parameters; of
LFP(f; x: t [f; x]) so that the corresponding LFP axioms are provable in PA+
.
Proof. In the following we work informally in PA+
. By the second recursion theorem,
choose an e (depending primitive recursively on the additional parameters of t) so that
we have for all x:
feg( x) ’ t[e; x]: (1)
We claim that e is indeed the least xed point of t. To see this, let f be another xed
point, i.e. assume that we have for all x:
ffg( x) ’n t[f; x]; (2)
where ’n denotes the natural partial equality relation which is associated to =n . Then
we establish by induction on the ordinals the following statement:
(8 x)[n(feg( x))!feg( x)=nffg( x)]: (3)
4 If the arity of a predicate can vary for each element of a given sequence, then we just use the notation .
5 We use f; g; a; b; u : : : as variables of L here.
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Due to Lemma 8, it is easily seen that (3) is in fact a 
 statement. Let us assume
that (3) holds for all <. Then we have by the denition of <n that
e<n f: (4)
Since t is p-monotonic, this implies for all x:
t[e; x]n t[f; x]: (5)
If we now assume n(feg( x)) for some x, then we obtain from (1), (2) and (5):
feg( x)= t[e; x] =n t[f; x] =nffg( x): (6)
This is exactly our claim and, hence, we are done.
It is important to mention here that p-monotonicity of t[f; x] is crucial for the fact
that indeed any recursion-theoretic xed point is already the least one. If we take, for
example, the (non p-monotonic) term t[f; x]f( x) from above, then a xed point can
be anything and, in particular, there are solutions for t which are not least.
In a next step we now want to associate to each previously interpreted term t of
type n a term t : n having the same parameters as t in such a way that (i) t is
p-monotonic, and (ii) t’n t, both provably in PA+
. This will immediately yield a
suitable interpretation of LFP expressions: in order to obtain a recursion-theoretic in-
terpretation of LFP(f; x: t), one just takes the least xed point of t, which exists by
the previous lemma; of course, this xed point is also the least xed point of t. For
t we can choose, for example,
t :=Conj(t; t):
The following lemma tells us that t is indeed p-monotonic, provably in PA+
.
Lemma 10. We have that t is provably p-monotonic in PA+
 for each term t : n.
Proof. In the sequel, we extend our  translation to terms t of type  ~! n by setting
t := t( x). In order to establish the claim of the lemma, one shows claims (i) and (ii)
below simultaneously by induction on the complexity of t:
(i) If t : n, then t is provably p-monotonic in PA+
;
(ii) If t : ( ;  ~! n), then we have for all r :  and s : : if the  translations of the
terms involving predicate types in r; s are provably p-monotonic in PA+
, then so
also t( r; s) is provably p-monotonic in PA+
.
If t is a variable a : n or f :  ~! n, then our claim is immediate from
a< b!Conj(a; a) Conj(b; b); (1)
f< g!Conj(f( s); f( s)) Conj(g( s); g( s)); (2)
which are both derivable in PA+
. In all other cases except possibly the LFP construc-
tion, the claim follows almost immediately from the induction hypotheses. It remains
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to discuss the case where t has the form LFP(h; x:s) for h :  ~! n, x :  and s : n.
This term may depend on additional parameters f :  ~!  and a :  involving predicate
types (and other parameters involving number types only). According to our discussion
above, we have a suitable interpretation of LFP(h; x:s), say ‘[ f; a ], which satises
for all x:
f‘[ f; a ]g( x) ’ s[‘[ f; a ]; f; a; x]: (3)
It is our aim to show that ‘ is p-monotonic with respect to f; a, which will immediately
imply that also its  translation is p-monotonic. For that purpose we assume that
f< g^ a< b: (4)
We want to derive ‘[ f; a] ‘[ g; b]. For this it enough to show for all ordinals 6
that
‘[ f; a] ‘[ g; b]; (5)
which we want to prove by 
 induction on the ordinals. Therefore, assume that (5)
holds for all ordinals <6, i.e.
‘[ f; a]< ‘[ g; b]: (6)
By the induction hypothesis for (i) we know that s is p-monotonic so that we readily
obtain from (4) and (6) for all x:
s[‘[ f; a]; f; a; x] s[‘[ g; b]; g; b; x]: (7)
From (7) and the xed point property (3) we can now immediately derive
‘[ f; a] ‘[ g; b] (8)
as desired. All together we have shown ‘[ f; a] ‘[ g; b] and, hence, we have estab-
lished that our interpretation of LFP expressions preserves p-monotonicity in parame-
ters. This concludes the proof of our lemma.
We have shown how to interpret the predicate type part of U(NFA) in the subsystem
PA+
 of Peano arithmetic with ordinals. Crucial use has been made of 

 induction
on the ordinals. In order to complete the embedding of U(NFA) in PA+
 + (Subst)
we readily observe that the substitution rule (Subst) of U(NFA) directly translates
into (Subst) as it is formulated in L
; to see this, notice that the premise of (Subst)
in U(NFA) is a U0(NFA) formula whose interpretation is just a formula of L and,
therefore, matches the premise of the (Subst) rule of L
. We have thus established
the following theorem.
Theorem 11. U(NFA) is contained in PA+
 + (Subst).
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Together with Corollary 5 and Theorem 7 we are now able to state the following
corollary about the proof-theoretic strength of U(NFA).
Corollary 12. U(NFA) is proof-theoretically equivalent to RA< 0 and conservatively
extends RA< 0 with respect to arithmetic statements.
6. The proof-theoretic strength of U1(NFA)
In this section we establish the proof-theoretic equivalence of the intermediate un-
folding system U1(NFA) and ramied analysis in all nite levels, RA<!. It readily
follows with the techniques presented in [15] that the proof-theoretic ordinal of RA<!
is exactly the rst xed point of the " function, namely ’20. The ordinal ’20 is also
known as the least ordinal which is not autonomous in a semiformal system for pure
number theory, cf. [15, p. 214]. Other known systems which possess proof-theoretic
ordinal ’20 and are proof-theoretically equivalent to RA<! include: (i) (01-CA) plus
bar or substitution rule (Subst), cf. [14]; (ii) the system (01-CA)!  in which the
existence of the 01 jump hierarchy is claimed up to and including !, cf. [14].
We divide our considerations into two subsections. First, we show that transnite
induction on each initial segment of ’20 is available in U1(NFA). In the second para-
graph we sketch an adaptation of the arguments of Section 5:3 in order to yield an
embedding of U1(NFA) in (01-CA) + (Subst).
6.1. Lower bounds
In the sequel, let us briey sketch a wellordering proof for the intermediate unfolding
system U1(NFA). In particular, we show that U1(NFA) proves TI(; P) for each ordinal
 less than the rst xed point of the " function, ’20. This will yield RA<! as a proof-
theoretic lower bound of U1(NFA).
In a rst step we dene a sequence of sets Yi (i2N) of natural numbers in U1(NFA)
inductively as follows:
Y0 := fm: P(m)g;
Yi+1 := fm: J(Yi; !m)g:
Observe that here J denotes the jump operation from Section 5.1. Notice further that
the initial segments of this Y hierarchy are the main ingredients used in the wellordering
proof of PA. In order to represent Yi (i2N) uniformly in U1(NFA), we rst choose a
term s : 1 ~! 1 so that U1(NFA) proves:
s(X ) # ^ (8y)(y2 s(X )$J(X;!y)):
Such an s exists by the predicate axioms Ax 6-11 only, in particular Join is not used
for the denition of s. Now, let t :  ~! 1 be given by least xed point recursion as
follows:
t :=LFP(f; x:fif x=0 then Pr else s(Pd(x))g):
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A straightforward induction on x yields that (8x)t(x) #, and indeed t uniformly repre-
sents the Y hierarchy in U1(NFA).
The following lemma is a straightforward adaptation to our context of Lemma 7(d)
in [15, p. 183]. Usually, this lemma is the main step in the wellordering proof for
(01-CA). As the proof in our framework is literally the same, we omit it and refer the
reader to [15] for details.
Lemma 13. U1(NFA) proves Prog(a:(8x)TI("a; t(x))).
Let us now assume that (n)n2N is a canonical fundamental sequence for ’20 given
by 0 =! and n+1 = "n . Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 14. U1(NFA) proves TI(n; P) for each natural number n.
Proof. We establish the claim of the theorem by metamathematical induction on n.
The case n=0 is trivial. For the step from n to n + 1 let us assume TI(n; P). An
invocation of (Subst) thus readily yields
TI(n; a:(8x)TI("a; t(x))): (1)
On the other hand, we know by the previous lemma that
Prog(a:(8x)TI("a; t(x))): (2)
From (1) and (2) we can immediately derive
(8x)TI(n+1; t(x)); (3)
which readily entails TI(n+1; P) as claimed. This nishes our argument.
Corollary 15. U1(NFA) proves TI(; P) for each  less than ’20.
6.2. Upper bounds
In this section we briey indicate how the upper bound argument for the full un-
folding system U(NFA) given in Section 5.3 is to be modied in order to yield an
upper bound of U1(NFA) in (01-CA) + (Subst).
One rst inductively denes a collection − of (non-unique) codes for the predicates
of U1(NFA); the generating clauses for − are just clauses (i){(vi) of the denition of
 in Section 5.3. It is straightforward that the so-obtained inductive denition produces
a primitive recursive set of codes −. In the next step one associates to each code
c2− its natural extension; this can easily be done via a 11 truth denition for
arithmetic sentences, which is available in (01-CA) as usual.
Once we have at hand the collection − of codes for predicates of U1(NFA) to-
gether with the intended extension for each such code, we can basically proceed as
in Section 5.3 in order to interpret the U1(NFA) terms involving predicate types. The
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main dierence is that ordinal levels of the sets in  can now be replaced by natural
numbers corresponding to the stage on which codes for U1(NFA) predicates are pro-
duced according to the inductive denition of −. Then the monotonicity notions as
well as Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 carry over directly to this much simpler framework.
Hence, the predicate part of U1(NFA) can be modeled directly in (01-CA). Moreover,
the substitution rule of U1(NFA) immediately translates into the corresponding rule for-
mulated in the language of (01-CA). Summing up, we have established an embedding
of U1(NFA) into (01-CA) + (Subst).
Theorem 16. U1(NFA) is contained in (01-CA) + (Subst).
Corollary 17. U1(NFA) is proof-theoretically equivalent to RA<! and conservatively
extends RA<! with respect to arithmetic statements.
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